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DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF THE
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES
IN INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION
HARRISON: I want to make one sort of diagnostic suggestion
based on what Burt Neuborne said to help show where our opinions
differ. Neuborne said that you do not want to have a naive version
of right answerism. I subscribe to a fairly naive version of right answerism, not so naive as to think it is easy to find the right answers,
but strong enough to hold that it is meaningful to say that there is a
right answer even if we do not know exactly what it is. I think that
how hard your notion of law is and how much you believe in right
answerism is a barometer of where you will put considerations like
the two he urged, which are very real ones, about certainty and
about possible unfairness to people who cannot afford to go to
court to get the executive overruled. The harder your concept of
law, the more likely you are to put those considerations on the prudence side of the law/prudence line. The softer your notion of law
and the more kinds of considerations you allow into what is law and
what is legally correct, the more likely you are to allow considerations like that to influence your judgment of what is or is not a legal
obligation.
NEUBORNE: That is an exceptionally perceptive diagnosis of
what often differentiates people, like me, who think that the
Supreme Court's decisions (and possibly the decisions of the circuit
courts as well) carry with them some positivist sanction; and people,
like John Harrison, who think that they do not. The issue really
turns to an almost paradoxical degree on how sure you are that you
know what the right answer is in a given case. I harbor a good deal
of skepticism about the notion that there is a single right answer to
almost any difficult judicial problem. There are easy cases, to be
sure, but the hard cases that often confront the Supreme Court,
both in statutory and constitutional questions, seem to me to almost
always carry with them powerful arguments on both sides. The hard
cases require more than a dogmatic assertion that there is a single
objectively existing external barometer that tells you when a court is
right or wrong. It seems to me that the great challenge of modern
jurisprudence is to deal with error deflection in those cases where
there is genuine doubt as to what the right answer is.
If there is really a single right answer, then all the branches of
386
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government should have an equal right to look for it. If what we are
doing is looking for the law of gravity, everybody should be able to
look for the law of gravity. But if, as I think, in a much, much more
sophisticated conception of law, law is an interplay between text,
intent, and the institutional organ given the responsibility of making
final determinations and breaking ties, then we have a situation
where the very indeterminacy of law cries out for some form of authoritative voice to speak it, and that authoritative voice in our system is the Court.
ROSS: I will try to bring a note of practicality to our discussion. These questions, as to whether or not the President is bound
by the law, come up in the real world. What it boils down to is
whether the President or, more often, someone else in the executive
branch, will follow a law as enacted by the Congress or whether they
will refuse to follow the dictates of the Congress. The President had
a recent confrontation over the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984,1 a bill that was designed, perhaps ill-advisably to cut the cost
of defense contracting by bringing a greater degree of competition
into the contracting process. The President thought that certain aspects of the bill were unconstitutional. Notwithstanding those constitutional concerns, he decided to sign the legislation into law. The
Attorney General wrote an opinion discussing what the executive
branch thought was unconstitutional about the law, and the director
of the Office of Management and Budget instructed all departments
of the executive branch to ignore the law. Now, I do not believe that
is a power prerogative that is within the ken of the executive
department.
The President, when faced with what he or she believes is an
encroachment by the Congress into constitutional prerogatives, has
two alternatives. The first, which the President foreswore in this
case, would be to veto the bill, and to see whether Congress could
have mustered the super-majority necessary to pass this objectionable law into statute. The second would be to wait for an appropriate
case to arise where there were people to challenge the law, and to
hope that the Court would agree with his view of the law as opposed
to the Congress' view of the law under our Constitution. It is, however, dangerous to any system based on the rule of law for the executive to believe that a third option exists which is simply to ignore
those laws which he or she does not agree with on constitutional
terms, regardless of whether it is a law which is intended to have the
executive do something or whether it is a law that is intended to
prevent the executive from doing something.
1

Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984).
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HARRISON: That is certainly an important issue in this context because it points up our differences in approach. Suppose an
earlier President had signed the law and then a new President comes
in and refuses to apply it. (There is a difficulty in the same President
signing it and then not applying it.) What the President is saying is
that this law that Congress passed is a statute of the United States
but it is contrary to the Constitution and he cannot follow it. Formally, that is exactly like what John Marshall did in Marbury v.
Madison.2 To say that the courts can do this and that the President
cannot is to appeal to the notion that the courts have this special
role, and that is exactly the issue on which we are differing.
NEUBORNE: Suppose that the President said that the statute
was contrary to the Constitution and that the case was brought and
the President lost. What does he do in the next case? Does he say
in the next case, I lost the last time, but that was just the last time,
and since I have a continuing right to construe the Constitution my
own way, I can continue to refuse to enforce this law? Can the President force anybody who wants a contrary result to drag him into
court to get a court order? Is that not what the real, practical problem is in ascribing to the President or the executive branch an autonomous power to construe the Constitution and law even after the
courts have spoken?
HARRISON: Absolutely. I think that if the President thinks
that the constitutional issue is important enough or that the political
issue is important enough, then he or she has a legal right to force
those with contrary interpretations to get a court order. The President has to be prepared to take the political heat resulting from such
actions, but it is legally entirely permissible for the President, just as
it is for an individual, to say, "Okay, sue me."
ROSS: I would disagree with that because under the Constitution the individual does not have the obligation to enforce the law
that the President does. Our constitutional system does not intend
the President to become a lawbreaker.
QUESTION: My question is for Mr. Ross. I work for the Secretary of Health and Human Services, enforcing statutes that have
been passed by your client. Most of my life is controlled by, and the
battles I fight are in defense of, statutes that the House compromised and worked out through very elaborate and time-tested procedures with some very clear and specific language. I do a lot of
work with the Social Security Act of 1935,3 and the House spends a
lot of time, periodically, amending it or fine-tuning it. Is there any
2
3

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1982).

1988]

THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTVE BRANCHES

389

kind of outrage or even sophisticated notice being made that, from a
Jeffersonian point of view, the courts are intruding very viciously on
those kinds of hard fought compromises and specific details that not
only the Speaker, but the other 434 representatives, have worked so
hard on? Do you notice any kind of legislative outcry against judicial
intrusion, or is it strictly something that we should only expect the
President to defend?
ROSS: There are a number of instances in which the mood in
the House after a particular decision is "How could they do that?
We made it clear, we said what we wanted, and they've done the
exact opposite." Now, those sentiments are not always well
founded, but they are there. I am not sure that I would ascribe any
Jeffersonian motive to it.
QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Neuborne and
Mr. Ross. Imagine that there had been a decision of the Supreme
Court saying that the Alien and Sedition Acts4 were constitutional
and did not violate the first amendment. Jefferson becomes President, and he did not sign this bill. He decides that he is going to
bring no cases under the Alien and Sedition Acts because he thinks
that they are unconstitutional. Is he doing something bad? Or is
there perhaps something to be said for pluralism in constitutional
interpretation as in other matters?
NEUBORNE: I guess you are really asking that if my political
ox gets gored, am I willing to say the same thing. I have the luxury
of sitting in a room this afternoon and not having my political ox
gored, so I can say yes, I am the world's most principled individual,
and I never compromise principle. Whether, in the real world, I will
compromise it, I do not know, but I think that the principled answer
to your question is that if the Supreme Court had passed on the
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and had made it
very clear that those acts were constitutional and that the President
believed that there were appropriate acts to bring within the discretion that any prosecutor has of allocating scarce resources among
lots of cases, it would be inappropriate for the President to not enforce the law simply because he disagrees with it.
ROSS: I would agree with that. The law is the law whether we
like it or not. There are ways of changing the law, but, just because
an individual does not like a law does not provide the individual
with an excuse to ignore it. Similarly, the executive branch is not
excused from enforcing it.
NEUBORNE: It is one thing to make ajudgment as a prosecutor that the allocation of your scarce resources is best used in en4

50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1982).
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forcing another law because it would be socially defeating, an
improper allocation of resources, or inefficient to enforce a particular law. There are a host of reasons why a good prosecutor makes
hard judgments about where to put the resources of his or her office. But it is an illegitimate form of argument to say: "Even though
I know that I could enforce that law, I know I could make it stick, I
know that it is something that is within my capacity to do, I simply
choose not to do it, because I disagree with what the Supreme Court
says the law is in this area."
QUESTION: Would you urge that more obscenity prosecutions be brought?
NEUBORNE: No, I think that they are socially self-defeating.
But if a prosecutor thought otherwise, I would not go up to him and
say: "Look, let's talk outside, maybe I can persuade you that the
Supreme Court is all wet in these things and even though you would
be able to go get the bookstores and close them down, let me see if I
can give you a brief which will persuade you that the Supreme Court
decisions are wrong." If I could persuade the prosecutor, then I
could make a private deal with him about whether those laws get
enforced. That is not the way a prosecutor should act.
ROSS: I would simply add that I took the question to have
factored out things such as prosecutorial discretion, and my argument is not against there being any prosecutorial discretion; it is
simply based solely on a question of constitutionality.
NEUBORNE: The prosecutor can have reservations because,
often, there is legitimate doubt about whether something is or is not
constitutional. But if you have the very same statute that was upheld the day before by the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor's reservations are strictly personal reservations and not the reservations
of what the Supreme Court of the United States says the law is at a
particular time, then those are not appropriate reservations to take
into account. Could the prosecutor hide them? Sure. In the real
world would the prosecutor be able to do something? Sure. Is it
right? No.
QUESTION: In the period between the Schechter decisions of
1935- and the NLRB decisions of 1937,6 the Roosevelt administration seemed to take the attitude of legislating first and litigating
later. In other words, the administration pushed statutes that it
5 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Schecter v.
United States, 295 U.S. 723 (1935).
6 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Freidman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S.
58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
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knew the Supreme Court would invalidate with the secret purpose
of shifting the blame for the Roosevelt administration's lack of ability to come up with reforms consistent with the Constitution onto
the Supreme Court. I wanted to ask the panel if they believe that
the executive or the Congress has the duty to at least consider the
constitutionality of a bill before passage? If so, does the passage of
a bill which obviously violates the Constitution, or which the Congress or the executive or both reasonably should realize will be invalidated by the Supreme Court, violate a public trust, in that public
officials take oaths to uphold and support the Constitution?
HARRISON: I will start by saying that I think that Congressmen have a legal obligation under the Constitution not to vote for
bills that they think are unconstitutional. Also, it seems to me inappropriate for a member of Congress to vote against a bill on constitutional grounds where the Court says it is unconstitutional but he
disagrees; I do not think that counts as a vote based on constitutional considerations. Moreover, although this is not the official
opinion of the executive branch necessarily, I personally have serious reservations about whether the President can get off the hook
on this question-whether he can sign a bill that he thinks is unconstitutional just because he knows that the Supreme Court is going to
uphold it. I am certain that he can do what Andrew Jackson did
which was veto on constitutional grounds something that the
Supreme Court had already upheld.
NEUBORNE: My sense is that it is the duty of the legislative
branch to take into account what they believe the Supreme Court
says the law is and, based on that good faith judgment, determine
whether or not they are passing a constitutional act. Since that is
almost always a question of very serious doubt, I think the practical
consequences of it are very, very slim. You would have to almost be
repassing the same act the day after the Court upheld it before you
got a really tight issue. Most of the time there are arguable distinctions between the statutes. If there are arguable distinctions between the statutes that the legislators in good faith feel distinguish
the statute, then I think that is the end of the question; it is up to
them.
NAGEL: I think that if you put the question in terms of a public trust, then yes, the legislature that passes a law that they think is
unconstitutional under judicial standards is breaching a public trust
because they are bringing on a certain amount of unpredictability
and disorder. Sometimes, however, there are other considerations
that are more important than that. If they are convinced that the
Court's judgment or predicted judgment is wrong, then they also
have an even greater public trust to pass the law under their own
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judgment of the Constitution. Let me add just one additional factor
to support that conclusion. The question that much of this discussion is skirting around is: what are the sources of law? It seems to
me that one of the sources of law, of constitutional law, even a
source of traditional legal meaning of constitutional law, is, as Judge
Posner said this morning, the political culture. I think that the political culture should not be disabled from participating in that system
because if it is, even traditional legal indicators of meaning like text
are going to be impoverished.
ROSS: I would say that as a theoretical matter, members of
Congress have an obligation to vote against legislation that they believe to be unconstitutional. However, as a practical matter, it is
very rarely that clear-cut when the matter is on the floor of the
House. One good example is the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Reduction Act, 7 in which there were many people expressing the opinion
that certain provisions of that statute were unconstitutional. Well,
we all know that portions of that statute were held unconstitutional;
however, it was not these portions that people were warning about.
Thus, it may be expecting too much for the Congress to have a crystal clear idea of what will be held constitutional when you are talking
about the types of legislation that are normally being considered.
QUESTION: If the President thinks something is unconstitutional, how can he sign it even if the Court will uphold it? How can
he administer the law according to the Court's view rather than his
own, when he sincerely believes in his own?
HARRISON: I do not have a final answer to that, but the answer that I am satisfied with for the moment is that the President is
really no different from any other citizen. Legal obligation is legal
obligation: the duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
has various consequences, but they are not consequences that create
any obligation upon the President different from any other subject
of the legal system. If we know that a citizen can ignore his own
conscientiously formed view of the law and follow the courts, then I
think that the other branches can do the same. The other branches
are placed in the situation of the citizen; they can either stand on
their own view and litigate, and probably lose, or they can tell their
consciences that they are going to go along with the courts instead.
NEUBORNE: That begs the question of my position. The
whole question is whether or not a member of the governmental
family is to be treated identically with a private person in that
situation.
7 Balanced Budget & Emergency Deficient Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
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QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Neuborne. Did I
understand you correctly, that from your position, you would reject
Abraham Lincoln's position on Dred Scott8 given in his first inaugural
address?
NEUBORNE: Well the Lincoln position on Dred Scott is a complex one. Much of what Lincoln rejected in Dred Scott was dictum,
and that makes it quite easy. I know of no theoretician who believes
that dictum has any self-executing, binding quality, and ninety-five
percent of Dred Scott is dictum. To the extent that Lincoln was urging that the holding of Dred Scott be disavowed by the federal government and not be complied with, rather than having it be
overturned by some more constitutional means, the answer is, I
think, yes, I do disagree. In fact, Dred Scott was dealt with by the
thirteenth and the fourteenth amendments and not by executive
non-acquiescence.
QUESTION: I would like to ask Mr. Ross how he can reconcile two of the propositions in his speech. One position seemed to
be that Congress had the right even against a Supreme Court decision on a particular bill simply to pass the bill again in the hopes
that the Supreme Court would change its mind. The other position,
one that I open with, is that the executive is incorrect, in a case like
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 9 to refuse to carry a
statute out on the grounds that it was unconstitutional when there
was no Supreme Court case dearly on point. Why would the President's oath to uphold the Constitution not give him this power, a
power that you assert that the Congress has even in the face of a
particular Supreme Court decision. So, I am trying to avoid the
question of whether this is a Supreme Court decision particularly on
point and put the question to you just starkly in terms of Congress'
greater power to interpret the Constitution in legislating than the
executive has in executing the law.
ROSS: I will answer that two.ways. First, the power that I
claim for the President is in the legislative process. One should not
confuse that process with the implementation of the law once it is
passed. During the legislative process, when an idea is being enacted, it is entirely appropriate for the President or the Congress to
state what they believe they want the law to be. However, when you
get outside the legislative process and you have an enacted statute,
the President and the executive branch than have other obligations
that they must carry out, which is to implement that law as it has
been enacted. Let me suggest to you that the idea that the President's authority and duty to the Constitution would excuse nonen8
9

Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984).
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forcement of a statute that he believes to be unconstitutional is a
very dangerous toy to give to any executive. All of us on the panel
have agreed that the President may keep his view of the Constitution and its impact on a particular statutory scheme, notwithstanding a Supreme Court decision on the subject, and that the President
can seek to have that decision overturned. If we were to allow the
President's belief that the statute is not constitutional to serve as an
excuse for nonenforcement of the statute, then we would have a situation where no matter what happened, no matter how many times
a statute was passed, no matter how many times it was upheld by the
Supreme Court, a recalcitrant executive could simply ignore the law.
That is not the system of government that we have.
HARRISON: It would be an extremely dangerous power in
the hands of the President not to enforce the law that the Congress
had passed because he thought it was unconstitutional. That is the
same power as judicial review, which is also extremely dangerous.
NEUBORNE: Until the Supreme Court speaks, I think that
the President has equal providence with Congress on the issue of
constitutionality, and if he has a conscientious scruple about enforcing that statute, then that is what you have courts for. It is only after
the courts have spoken that I would be troubled by a President that
continued to ignore the statute.
QUESTION: Professor Neuborne, I think, correctly pointed
out that what we are primarily discussing here is a question of philosophy of law with implications not so much for disposition of individual controversies, but for the effects of an idea on society and on
government. Professor Nagel pointed out some of those effects,
suggesting the possible increased arrogance among the judiciary
and increased timidity among the other branches or citizenry. Professor Neuborne made this concession on the grounds that the practical consequences between a realpolitik approach to this question
and a duty to obey the resolution of it were not very different, and
then proceeded to address the philosophical issue. Both of his justifications for finding a duty to obey, however, were profoundly practical, and if his assertion about duty to obey and realpolitik producing
very similar results is true, then the point he made really should not
be valid in practice. There should not be much difference in preevent behavior because, as he asserted, the incentives set up under
the realpolitik and duty to obey approaches are so similar, and there
should not be that much difference in the equality of protection that
people with and without resources get in these two situations.
Given that, is he not in fact granting enormous philosophical power
to the Court essentially for no reason?
NEUBORNE: First, I do not really think that there is all that
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much difference between philosophy and practicality. Pragmatism
has a very important role to play in philosophy. Philosophy is not
divorced from the real world, and I do not consider it a sin to make
an argument about legal theory which takes into account the implications in the real world of that legal theory. It is one of the things
that good philosophers should do. But second, I think you misstate
the position. In the vast bulk of situations the issues would come
out the same. The problem is what do we do about those potentially
very important situations where they do not come out the same.
I should have made this disclosure at the beginning because I
think it is appropriate at a forum like this for you to know what my
biases are: I am counsel in a case in which I challenge the executive's failure to acquiesce in established precedent in the context of
Social Security Administration cases.' 0 You know, a real world situation. Suppose that the Supreme Court construes the Social Security Act as giving entitlement X, and the President believes it gives
only entitlement Y. The Supreme Court's decision is unequivocal.
Is it then lawful for the President to continue to administer the Social Security Act so that individuals applying for the entitlement do
not get it and have to take the government to court in case after case
after case? Those people who do not have the sophistication to get
to court do not get the entitlement. Now that is not an ivory tower
problem, that is the problem of hundreds of thousands of people
over the last couple of years in the context of administrative nonacquiescence. That is a very important practical question, and I
think there is only one answer to it: "The rule of law means that
everybody gets the same benefits whether or not they can afford a
lawyer."
QUESTION: My question is for Professor Neuborne. All of
the remarks since your presentation make it pretty clear that there
are all sorts of constitutional norms and levers which avoid some of
the worst consequences both you and Mr. Ross point to. What I
would like to know at this point is what are the precise constitutional
nightmares that we face if we do not accept your position that decisions in the Supreme Court should be treated as positive law?
NEUBORNE: The constitutional nightmare is dual. In large
numbers of situations-in National Labor Relations Board settings,
in settings involving the Society Security Act, in settings involving
the administration of the entitlement programs, to the extent that
the executive believes its obligation to comply with Supreme Court
precedent is essentially a prudential one-the executive picks and
chooses based on, I am sure, good faith judgments about whether it
10

Steiberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).

396

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:386

should or should not comply. That means that it is then purely a
function of the resources available to the group affected by the statute. The wealthy will live under a set of laws that are enforced in the
courts because they can afford to take the executive to the next step.
The poor, unless we provide them with vastly increased resources,
must abide by the executive law. Many of you, I think, would agree
that it would be absurdly inefficient to create an expensive machine
to enforce something which should have been done in the first
place. But unless we are willing to create that machine, then the
consequence of not giving the poor those resources is to say that
there are two systems of law in the country: one for the rich, and
one for the poor. That is a constitutional nightmare.
QUESTION: Do not the so-called underprivileged or underclass have recourse to the legislative system to make up for that imbalance that you would say would occur in the advocacy system?
NEUBORNE: Would that it were so.
ROSS: If I could just follow up on that, I think, not to denigrate the nightmare that Professor Neuborne identifies for individual citizens, that if you are talking of constitutional nightmares, the
system that you suggest would also emasculate the legislative branch
from being able to enact policy. The entitlements that Professor
Neuborne is talking about are entitlements which were guaranteed
by the passage of a statute, and what you would be doing is you
would be giving the President a non-reviewable ability to negative a
law which goes far beyond the legal authority he is given.
NEUBORNE: Exactly. It is a defacto extension, expansion, of
the veto power to enormous proportions.
HARRISON: To claim that much for it is to omit, I think, the
requirement that the view taken of the law by the executive has to be
one sincerely held. In the correct case, we are talking about a situation where the executive really disagrees with the courts about what
the law really means or the courts disagree with some members of
Congress about what the law really means. This is simply a consequence of separation of powers, where one group of people pass the
law and somebody else executes it. For the President to execute the
laws incorrectly is a violation of constitutional responsibility, but for
him to execute them as he best understands them and with an eye
on various powerful considerations of prudence, is precisely what
the constitutional arrangement contemplates.
NEUBORNE: In fairness to the current administration, I
should make clear that I know of no situation in which they have
refused in good faith to comply quickly and expeditiously with a decision of the Supreme Court in the area of entitlements. The litigation we have going on now involves the self-executing power of
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circuit court precedent within the intra-circuit geographical area.
That is a much harder question and we did not get a chance to discuss that here.
QUESTION: Mr. Ross drew a distinction that I thought was
interesting between a President's power to interpret the Constitution in legislative and non-legislative situations. I would be interested to know whether Professor Neuborne agrees in this context.
Assume that the Supreme Court has been confronted with a Draconian quota system, challenged as reverse discrimination under the
fourteenth amendment, and the Supreme Court says it is not offensive to the fourteenth amendment. Shortly thereafter, the Congress
passes some bill which proceeds to legislate along the same lines,
and codifies the Supreme Court decision. It is presented to President Reagan who vetoes it on the grounds that it is his judgment
that this is an unconstitutional bill. Do you think that is an appropriate exercise because this is the legislative process?
NEUBORNE: The answer, I think, is this. It is clear, at least
to me, that the President is not obliged to sign the bill under those
circumstances. The President does not have to subordinate his
judgment about what is good policy to the judgment of the Supreme
Court or to the courts, or to the Congress. It would, however, be
intellectually dishonest for him to couch his veto message on the
grounds that the bill is unconstitutional. I think it would be much
more intellectually honest for the President to say: "The Supreme
Court and I have a principled disagreement about what is constitutional here and what is not. I profoundly believe that they are
wrong. I recognize that they have spoken, and therefore, I cannot
say to you that this bill is unconstitutional. I can say, however, that
it is my judgment that it should be unconstitutional, and therefore,
as President, I will not sign it." I think that is appropriate.
COMMENT BY DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG (Judge, United
States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit): I notice that the discussion
glided very smoothly from one of prosecutorial discretion to one of
a situation described by the non-acquiescence policy. I offer a distinction for your consideration that I think the hypertrophied sensitivities of a law professor can overcome, but that practical judgment
might embrace. The President's decision, because of his own constitutional views, not to enforce a particular law necessarily because
he believes that it is unconstitutional, stands on a very different footing than placing impediments or burdens on citizens exercising a
right or claiming an entitlement under an Act of Congress. This is
true even if that burden is placed where it is thought to be constitutional, for constitutional reasons.
The difference is that in the non-prosecution case the President
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is deciding not to bring the coercive power of the state to bear on
the individual. That, I think, puts the decision on a very different
footing than one where he decides to burden the individual,
notwithstanding a congressional determination upheld by the
Supreme Court to the contrary. I think that we should err on the
side of tolerating that decision because as a practical matter the alternative is not that the force will be exerted, but rather that the
President, assuming that this is an act of conscience, will have to
dissemble as to the grounds for the non-enforcement. That strikes
me as an unhealthy result.
NEUBORNE: I wish I could buy into that distinction because
it would make my position a lot easier. Although I do not disagree,
I think that the force of the distinction you make between the difference in not imposing government power versus putting a burden on
a citizen has force, but the force that it has for me is not to allow the
President to justify what he is doing based on constitutional
grounds when the Supreme Court has completely undercut that position. It seems to me that it ought to allow a law enforcement official to say: "Look, I'm not enforcing this within my prosecutorial
discretion. I can't pass the buck and say that it's unconstitutional. I
take full responsibility for the judgment not to enforce this law and
if you want to do something to me, you can. You can vote me out of
office. But I'm not going to hide behind the Constitution in making
myjudgment." That would be much more intellectually honest, and
I think theoretically more correct.
GINSBURG: But I think you can say that the President would
not, could not hide behind the Constitution, while in fact he can. In
fact he exposes himself to further legislative response by invoking
the Constitution. We saw that in the impoundment situation. If the
President were to say, for reasons of constitutional interpretation,
that a particular law would not be enforced during his administration, then you would get a new kind of law. What you would have
instead of a law saying X is unlawful, is a new law passed by the
Congress saying that the Attorney General and the United States
Attorneys must expend the following sums in the furtherance of this
law and report back on all complaints received under the statute
every six months and so on and so on, and the tussle between the
two branches would have been played out. That strikes me as a very
unhealthy way of resolving the matter.
COMMENT BY FRANK EASTERBROOK (Judge, United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit): I have been troubled
throughout this discussion by the fact that no one has articulated
what he sees as the basis ofjudicial review. We have been trying to
make comparative judgments about the extent to which particular
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branches are bound by constitutional constructions without having
articulated what that basis might be. It came out most forcefully in
the exchange between Mr. Harrison and Professor Neuborne in
which Professor Neuborne ended up saying: "Well if it's true, as
Mr. Harrison says, that there are right answers to constitutional
questions, then obviously it follows that the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches can give different answers." So from the fact
that there are right answers, there are multiple answers. From the
fact that there are many possible answers, it must follow that there is
only one answer, that is, whatever answer the judge gives. It seems
to me buried in that is a very unusual theory ofjudicial review under
which what the judge is doing is sorting from a large variety of permissible answers, announcing one, and that one becomes binding.
It seems to me that as soon as one says that there are a large variety
of permissible answers, it ought to follow that no choice from within
the permissible zone is necessarily binding on everyone else, in
other words, that Mr. Harrison and Professor Neuborne have everything exactly backwards: if there is one right answer, everybody had
better follow it, but if there are multiple permissible answers, we do
not have a theory under which everyone must follow one answer.
HARRISON: Since we have everything backwards, let me answer for Professor Neuborne. As I understand it, his positionwhich seems to me a different and very interesting form of right
answerism-involves a two-stage theory of law. At the first stage, law
is relatively clear and definite, but it does not take you all the way to
one right answer. Instead, the first step imposes a constraint, it narrows you down from thousands of possible answers to, for example,
ten possibilities. The second stage is driven by the need to come up
with a right answer, but it is limited by uncertainty and complication: no one of the ten possibilities can be said to be correct just on
the basis of its content. So instead of a rule for identifying the right
answer based on the content of the answer, at the second stage you
have a rule based on the identity of the answerer: what the Supreme
Court says is correct by definition. Thus, for Professor Neuborne,
the reality of multiple plausible answers combined with the need for
one, single rule leads to the conclusion that only one person can
have the right answer: from many truths, one view of the truth. My
approach, which defines correctness entirely in terms of content and
not at all in terms of the identity of the answerer, leads from one
truth to multiple permissible views. In response to Judge Easterbrook, I think that our positions naturally lead to that outcome and
that it is only paradoxical on the surface.
NEUBORNE: In a very interesting way, the debate between
the two of us and the paradox that Judge Easterbrook has pointed
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out, is the paradox between Protestant theology and Catholic theology in terms of the interpretation of the holy writ. I have felt for
some years now that the great discussion about using literary texts
as a paradigm for talking about the Constitution is somewhat beside
the point. As an ACLU lawyer, it has always seemed to me that there
have been three groups that really know what constitutional adjudication is all about: Talmudic scholars, Jesuit seminarians, and
ACLU lawyers. We each have a holy text; we labor over it for a great
deal of time, and we spend a good deal of time worrying about how
the authoritative answer comes out. Each group has evolved a theory of an "answerer." What I am saying is, given my perception that
law is essentially indeterminate in many, many settings; and that a
false determinacy is intellectually dishonest in many situations; and
if, as I believe, society requires that there be an authoritative voice
so that we can have pre-event ordering and post-event equity, then
you need a theory of an "answerer" that will allow one of the potential answers to become the authoritative one. I believe Marbury
gives us that. Judge Easterbrook's perception that this whole debate
begins with legitimacy of judicial review is exactly right. It is in the
necessity of deciding a case or controversy that I believe that the
judicial branch assumes the legitimate mantle of the "answerer." It
is the mechanism that gives us the authoritative voice that breaks us
out of the trap of cacophony. I believe that cacophony in the law is
the terrible price that we would pay if we went any other way. I do
not contend that the Constitution compels my view. I say merely
that the Constitution permits it. And it is so clearly better, that it is
the path we ought to go down.
HARRISON: What Professor Neuborne just said is a consistent application of his view of the nature of law: we can say with
confidence that the Constitution permits only a certain limited
number of answers, but we cannot necessarily determine with confidence which of those is the right one, so it is not correct to say that
there is a right one. I hope that line of argument sounds familiar,
because it leads into the final metaphor I want to suggest about
classical law (and I will call my view classical): classical law is classical as classical theories are distinguished from quantum theories. In
quantum theories, there is not a right answer about a lot of questions. Certain complementary characteristics of systems are simply
not defined. In a classical theory there are answers to all the questions even if we are not sure what they are.

